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Abstract—The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19)
is imposing a severe worldwide lock-down. Contact tracing based
on smartphones’ applications (apps) has emerged as a possible
solution to trace contagions and enforce a more sustainable
selective quarantine. However, a massive adoption of these apps
is required to reach the critical mass needed for effective contact
tracing. As an alternative, geo-location technologies in next
generation networks (e.g., 5G) can enable Mobile Operators
(MOs) to perform passive tracing of users’ mobility and contacts
with a promised accuracy of down to one meter. To effectively
detect contagions, the identities of positive individuals, which
are known only by a Governmental Authority (GA), are also
required. Note that, besides being extremely sensitive, these data
might also be critical from a business perspective. Hence, MOs
and the GA need to exchange and process users’ geo-locations
and infection status data in a privacy-preserving manner. In
this work, we propose a privacy-preserving protocol that enables
multiple MOs and the GA to share and process users’ data to
make only the final users discover the number of their contacts
with positive individuals. The protocol is based on existing
privacy-enhancing strategies that guarantee that users’ mobility
and infection status are only known to their MOs and to the
GA, respectively. From extensive simulations, we observe that
the cost to guarantee total privacy (evaluated in terms of data
overhead introduced by the protocol) is acceptable, and can also
be significantly reduced if we accept a negligible compromise in
users’ privacy.
Index Terms—Mobile Operators, Privacy, Covid19
I. INTRODUCTION
Following recent surge of the coronavirus disease (Covid-
19) epidemic, various governmental and organizational bod-
ies are expressing strong interest in employing mobile-
communication technologies to early detect contagions. With
the term ‘early detection’, we refer to the identification of
positive individuals before they show any symptoms. This
generally happens during the incubation period of the virus
(around 5 days for Covid-19 [1]), or even during the entire
course of the disease. As asymptomatic people unknowingly
diffuse the virus, early detection is fundamental to drastically
limit virus spread [1].
Several smartphone-based apps for early detection are al-
ready available [2]–[4]. These apps allow a user to know
whether she encountered positive individuals or not (e.g., by
correlating her mobility with that of known positive cases). In
most countries, to comply with strict local privacy regulations,
these apps are developed with privacy as a primary design
constraint. However, app-based approaches suffer from several
drawbacks. First, it is hard to reach the critical mass needed
for an effective contact tracing (a typical safe number is 60%
of population, a very challenging target [3]). In addition,
these apps require the continuous use of data acquisition
technologies (e.g., the GPS and the Bluetooth) that extensively
consume devices’ batteries. We also note that people is less
likely to keep such apps installed on their smartphones at
the very beginning of the epidemics, when early detection is
decisive to contain the diffusion of the virus.
Contact tracing exploiting users’ mobility data collected by
mobile telecom operators (MOs) is regarded as a promising
alternative to app-based solutions [5]. In the upcoming years,
once 5G will have consolidated its penetration, MOs will
possess technologies to perform a continuous and accurate
tracking of users devices. For instance, Ref. [6] shows that
the average accuracy of device positioning in ultra-dense 5G
networks will be on the sub-meter order. A great advantage
of a passive and continuous positioning is the very limited
involvement of the final users. Users are not required to install
any application on their smartphones, but only to give an
explicit consent to track their position (explicit consent that
is currently commonly granted to several apps, such as [2],
[4]), therefore more easily reaching the critical mass. Even
though users (and governments) are becoming more concerned
regarding possible violation of the privacy of positioning data
by the MOs [7] (e.g., a MO might sell them to third parties),
we remark that MOs already estimate subscribers’ positions
to improve their services [8], and that the proposed approach
guarantees that MOs do not get any sensitive data beyond it.
To effectively obtain an early detection of infections through
mobility tracing, in addition to users’ mobility data discussed
above, the identities of positive individuals, which are only
known to a Governmental Authority (GA) through the nation
medical institutions, are required, and this is (a possibly
even more)-sensitive information that must not be exposed.
Therefore, MOs and the GA are required to collect, exchange
and process this mobility data (from MO) and infection data
(from the GA) in a secure and a privacy-preserving manner.
In this work, we propose a privacy-preserving protocol that
enables GA and MOs to securely share and process users’
data, such that each user is guaranteed to be the only person
who knows the number of contacts with positive individuals
she had (henceforth referred to as user’s score). The protocol is
built on consolidated privacy-enhancing strategies (e.g., secure
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secret sharing and homomorphic encryption) that guarantee
total privacy to users, i.e., the mobility and the infection
status of a user are only known to her MO and to the GA,
respectively.
This privacy is achieved at an acceptable cost in terms of
data overhead exchanged among MOs and GA, as shown from
extensive simulations. With slight modifications, the proposed
protocol can also be employed i) to make this user discover
how many positive people were in her same locations, but
not necessarily in her close proximity (e.g., in a pub) and ii)
to make the GA know only the identities of the users with
a score above a given threshold. The identification of these
users would make it possible to more easily stop the diffusion
of the virus, but it poses a privacy dilemma and does not
comply to several privacy regulations. In this work, we only
provide the technical means to realize such identification in a
privacy-preserving manner. Note also that, in case the number
of these users is high, such procedure requires the exchange
of a significant data overhead. However, we also show that
this overhead can be heavily reduced at a negligible reduction
of users’ privacy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section
II we briefly review some existing approaches for privacy-
preserving contact tracing. Section III describes the involved
entities and their privacy requirements. We present the building
blocks of the proposed protocol and the protocol itself in
Sections IV and V, respectively. In Section VI we show some
illustrative results obtained by simulation. Finally, Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing solutions for contact tracing are generally based
on smartphone apps of two main types: i) location-based
(e.g., PrivateKit from MIT [2]) in which user’s locations are
acquired (e.g., with the GPS technology) and correlated with
the locations of positive individuals; ii) token-based (e.g.,
TraceTogether [3] and Immuni [4]) that exchange anonymized
tokens with smartphones in the proximity of the user (i.e.,
by exploiting the Bluetooth), and successively match the
received tokens with those of known positive persons. A user
who is tested positive can deliberately share her data (either
location or received tokens) with a trusted authority, who then
broadcasts it to all the others. Based on this, the app returns
if a user has been in contact with a positive individual [2].
As operations are done on users’ devices, privacy is mostly
preserved, i.e., users’ location and contacts are not exposed to
the authority.
However, several privacy issues are still pending. For in-
stance, in location-based apps each user receives the location
data of a positive person, whose identity might be obtained
from re-identification attacks [3], [9]. In TraceTogether [3]
users send their phone numbers and all the received tokens
to the authority, which in turn sends a message to those
users who met some positive person. As users’ contacts
are exposed to the authority, this solution would hardly be
adopted in countries with strict privacy laws, and several
solutions are proposed to solve this issue [3]. For example,
users might send to the authority only their tokens, and then
perform anonymized queries to know if they met some positive
person. However, other malicious behaviors are possible given
that users obtain the tokens of persons in their proximity.
Specifically, a user can craft a query to discover if the person
that she met at a given time is positive [3].
In this work, we exploit consolidated privacy-preserving
techniques (e.g., as those employed in [10], [11]) to com-
pute the number of contacts that a user had with positive
people, while guaranteeing that users’ contacts, locations and
infection status are not disclosed to illegitimate parties (see
subsection III-B for further details). Differently from token-
based solutions that only detect users’ proximity, our protocol
allows to compute also the number of positive persons within a
given place. Unlike existing location-based apps, however, we
assume that users’ locations are estimated by MOs without any
involvement of the users (e.g., using techniques for accurate
geo-localization from cellular signals, such as those proposed
in [6]). In this respect, authors in [5], [12] argue that MOs
might play a decisive role in fighting the spreading of a virus,
provided that users’ privacy is guaranteed.
III. MODELING OF INVOLVED ENTITIES
In this Section, we formally define the concept of users’
scores, and we describe the role and privacy requirements of
the entities involved in their computation. Before doing that,
we introduce the concepts of contact and infection status. We
say that two persons useri and userj have a contact iff the
distance between them is below a given threshold th. We
encode this information in the binary variable c(t)ij = 1 if
Dist(loc
(t)
i , loc
(t)
j ) < th, and 0 otherwise, where loc
(t)
i and
loc
(t)
j refer to the geo-location (e.g., latitude and longitude)
of useri and userj at time t, respectively, while Dist is a
measure of geographical distance. Concerning the infection
status, we then introduce the binary variable s(t)i = 1 in case
useri is considered positive at time t, and 0 otherwise. Scorei
is the number of contacts that useri has, during a given period
of time, with positive individuals. In formulas:
Scorei =
∑
t
∑
j:cij=1
s
(t)
j (1)
Similarly, Score(Loc)i is the number of positive persons that
were in a certain location Loc at the same time of useri, and is
computed as Score(Loc)i =
∑
j∈Loc s
(t)
j , where the considered
locations are assumed to be chosen by useri herself.
A. Role of Involved Entities
The GA is an entity established by the government to
monitor the infection status of individuals within a certain
region and, specifically, to collect from medical institutions
the identities of positive individuals willing to share this data.
MOs are instead telecom companies that provide mobile
connectivity within the considered region. Without loss of
generality, we assume that each user is served by only one
MO, and that the whole area is covered by all the MOs. Then,
we also assume that MOs estimate the locations of their users
at time t, i.e., ˆloc
(t)
i ,∀i from cellular signals received by users’
devices (e.g., as done in [6]).
B. Privacy Requirements and Security Models
We assume that the GA and the MOs are honest-but-
curious, i.e., they honestly execute the protocol but also try to
violate other parties’ privacy from the received data. Privacy
requirements for each type of data are illustrated below.
1) Users’ Locations: estimates of a user’s locations should
only be known to her MO.
2) Users’ Contacts: information regarding contacts be-
tween two users should only be known to their MOs. In
addition, if these users are subscribers of different MOs, each
MO should not know anything neither about the identity of the
other MO’s user, nor about the number of contacts between
its users and any other user of its competitors (e.g., how many
contacts useri and userj have during a given period).
3) Users’ Infection Status and Scores: The infection status
of a user should only be known to the GA and to the
user herself (say useri). Scorei and Score
(Loc)
i should only
be known to useri, except when Scorei is greater than a
threshold χ. In this case, Scorei and the identity of useri
might also be known to the GA (see subsection V-C for the
details).
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING
PROTOCOL
A. Existing Privacy-Preserving Building Blocks
1) Shamir Secret Sharing: A Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS)
scheme [13] allows to securely distribute a secret s among a
set of participants in such a way that s can only be recovered
if a sufficient number of them cooperate. The piece of secret s
that each participant receives is called share, and it is referred
to as JsK. In this work, we employ a (2, 2) SSS, i.e., s is
reconstructed only if 2 out of the 2 considered participants
cooperate. SSS has several homomorphic properties, i.e., each
participant can perform several operations on the shares that
result in the same operations over the corresponding secrets
(e.g., linear combinations). Then, participants can computeJs1 ·s2K using the Mult protocol presented in [14], or they can
use the EQ and Comp protocols [14] to perform the equality
check and the comparison operations. In the latter, participants
input their shares Js1K and Js2K and obtain the share JbeqK
(resp., JbgeK), where beq = 1 (resp., bge = 1) iff s1 = s2
(resp., s1 ≥ s2) and 0 otherwise.
2) Paillier Cryptosystem: Paillier [15] is a secure cryp-
tosystem with the following properties: i) it is asymmetric,
i.e., anyone can encrypt a message, but only the owner of
the private key can decrypt it; ii) it is probabilistic, i.e., two
encryptions of the same plaintext yield different ciphertexts
and iii) it is homomorphic with respect to the summation of
two ciphertexts (computed as Enc(m1 + m2) = Enc(m1) ·
Enc(m2)) and to the product between a ciphertext and a
plaintext (computed as Enc(m1 ·m2) = Enc(m1)m2 ).
B. New Privacy-Preserving Primitives based on SSS
1) Secure Square Distance: the Secure Square Distance
module takes in input the shares of the coordinates of points
i and j, i.e., JxiK, JyiK, JxjK, JyjK and returns Jd2ijK, where dij
is the euclidean distance between these points. This module is
based on the Mult subroutine.
2) ObliviousTransfer: the ObliviousTransfer module (OT)
allows a sender to deliver some data to a receiver without
knowing which data has been transmitted. OT inputs i) a set
of 2N shared elements arranged into a table with N rows
and two columns (namely, attribute and value) and ii) the
share JattributexK. This module is based on the Mult and EQ
subroutines and outputs the share JvalueiK if the attribute at
row i is equal to attributex, and J0K otherwise. This value is
computed as JvalueiK =∑Nj=1Jeqjx·valuejK, where eqjx = 1
if attributex = attributej , and 0 otherwise.
V. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol works in three main phases, namely
contact tracing, score computation and communication with
users. We describe these phases in the following subsections.
We refer to the generic users useri and userj as subscribers
of MOk and MOk′, respectively, but the described operations
are valid for each user and MO.
A. Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing
In this phase, MOk obtains the binary value cij encod-
ing the information about its generic useri’s contacts, ∀i.
Firstly, MOk estimates the current location of useri, i.e.,
( ˆlat
(t)
i ,
ˆlong
(t)
i ) by analyzing cellular signals coming from
her device [6]. From this data, the MOk can independently
assess the contacts among its subscribers, but not with other
MOs’ users (since a free exchange of users’ mobility data is
prohibited by the considered privacy requirements). Hence, we
propose to perform the privacy-preserving computation of cij
as follows.
MOk and MOk′ compute the projections of their users’
estimated positions on an euclidean plane (e.g., xˆ(t)i , yˆ
(t)
i ) and
exchange these values among them in form of secret shares.
Then, they execute the Secure Square Distance module and
obtain Jd2ijK, being d2ij the squared euclidean distance between
the generic useri and userj . The Comp module is then
employed to compare Jd2ijK with the threshold Jth2K and obtainJcijK. The MOs finally exchange these shares and recover the
secret cij (that is 1 if useri and userj has a contact, and 0
otherwise). A representation of this phase is depicted in Fig.
1.
B. Secure Computation of Users’ scores
In this phase, MOk securely computes the score values of
useri. To do so, the GA sends to MOk the infection status (in
encrypted form) of useri during a considered period (e.g., in
the last day), i.e., EncGA(s
(t)
i ),∀t. At each time instant of the
considered period, MOk and MOk′ obtain c
(t)
ij as described in
the previous subsection. If this value is 1 (i.e., there is a contact
between these users at time t), MOk and MOk′ exchange
Fig. 1: Positioning process and privacy-preserving contact
tracing performed by a pair of MOs
TABLE I: Data of subscribers of MOk
Index Identity Score
1 Id1 = Name1||PhoneNumber1 EncGA(score1)
... ... ...
i Id1 = Namei||PhoneNumberi EncGA(scorei)
... ... ...
Nk IdNk = NameNk ||PhoneNumberNk EncGA(scoreNk )
with each other EncGA(s
(t)
i ) and EncGA(s
(t)
j ). Then, MOk
computes EncGA(Scorei) by homomorphically executing the
summation in Eq. 1. Similarly, MOk computes Score
(Loc)
i by
homomorphically summing the encrypted infection status of
all users within area Loc at a given time, which are asked to
all the remaining MOs.
The obtained data are then arranged by MOk in a table
that we represent in Table I. Such table has Nk rows (one
of each subscriber of MOk) and three columns, which are
Index, Identity and Score. The first refers to the index of the
row at which a certain user’s data is stored. Without loss of
generality, we assume that useri’s data is stored at the i-th row.
The second one stores the identities of the users (e.g., anything
allowing to univocally identify them, such as full names and
telephone numbers). The third represents the Score values of
users in encrypted form.
C. Communication with users
In this phase, we show how to distribute users’ scores only
to the legitimate entity (i.e., either the user herself or the GA).
We consider the scenarios of User-Triggered Communication
and GA-Triggered Communication. In the former, scores are
requested by useri herself, and are kept secret to any other
entity. In the latter, the GA identifies only the users with a
score greater than a given threshold χ.
1) User-Triggered Communication: useri directly asks to
MOk the values EncGA(scorei) and EncGA(score
(Loc)
i ),
for any location she is interested in. Then, useri exploits
the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem to
compute EncGA(Scorei ·Tokeni), where Tokeni is a random
value known only to her. EncGA(Scorei · Tokeni) is then
sent to the GA, which deciphers it and sends Scorei ·Tokeni
back to useri. Finally, useri removes the mask Tokeni and
obtains Scorei. A similar computation is performed to obtain
score
(Loc)
i . We represent this phase in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Representation of the User-triggered communication
2) GA-Triggered Communication: MOk sends to the GA
indexx and EncGA(scorex),∀x. Then, the GA deciphers
EncGA(scorex) and obtains (indexx, scorex),∀x. In case
∃i : scorei ≥ χ, the GA and MOk jointly execute the OT
subroutine described in subsection IV-B2. To do so, MOk
sends to the GA JindexxK and JidentityxK,∀x, while the
GA sends to MOk JindexiK. With these values in input,
the OT module returns to MOk and to the GA their sharesJidentityiK. Finally, MOk sends its share JidentityiKMOk to
the GA, which combines it with JidentityiKGA and recover
the identity of useri. In the next subsection, we show how the
proposed protocol fulfills the considered privacy requirements
under the honest-but-curious security model.
D. Fulfillment of Privacy Requirements
1) Users’ Locations: during the contact tracing phase,
estimated users’ locations are distributed among pairs of MOs
as secret shares. As SSS is proven information-theoretic secure
[13], no information about locations is obtained from the
single shares owned by each MO.
2) Users’ Contacts: at each execution of the contact tracing
phase, pairs of MOs distribute to each other new shares
of their users’ locations. This prevents a leakage of users’
identities (which cannot be inferred from locations’ shares),
as well as from counting the number of contacts between
two users. Then, during the score computation phase, MOk′
can homomorphically compute EncGA(sj +0) (which yields
a different ciphertext without altering the hidden infection
status), in such a way that MOk cannot count the number
of contacts between useri and userj .
3) Users’ Infection Status and Scores: MOk computes
useri’s scores by performing homomorphic summations on
values encrypted by the GA but, since it does not know the
private encryption key, it does not discover any plaintext.
Then, in the user-triggered communication scenario, useri
sends EncGA(si · Tokeni) to the GA. As the latter does not
know Tokeni, it cannot obtain the actual values of the scores.
Finally, in the GA-triggered communication scenario, GA and
MOk execute the OT module. From this execution, the GA
learns the identity of useri and MOk learns nothing. As the
GA is considered a honest-but-curious entity, we assume that
it executes the OT module only to identify users with the
highest chance to be positive (i.e., if scorei ≥ χ). Clearly,
the GA might execute this module regardless of the value of
scorei and learn the identity and scores of all the users. In
the next subsection, we discuss a possible extension of the
protocol to cope with this malicious behaviour of the GA.
E. Extension of the protocol for dishonest participants
We now describe how the protocol can be improved to
address two malicious schemes. In the first one, the GA tries to
obtain the identity of useri when Scorei < χ. The proposed
solution works as follows: MOk selects two random variables
τ1 and τ2 and computes EncGA(τ1 · scorex + τ2),∀x. These
values are then sent to the GA in form of secret share, i.e.,JEncGA(τ1 · scorex + τ2)K,∀x and given in input to the
OT module. From its execution, MOk and the GA obtainJEncGA(τ1 · scorei + τ2)K. MOk sends its share to the GA,
which can then recover the secret EncGA(τ1 · scorei + τ2)
and, from it, the plaintext τ1 · scorei + τ2. Finally, the GA
sends to MOk both τ1 · scorei + τ2 and scorei. Since the
GA never obtains the values τ1 and τ2, it cannot counterfeit a
scorei ≥ χ and a corresponding valid τ1 · scorei + τ2. MOk
detects a cheat if scorei < χ or the actual τ1 · scorex + τ2
cannot be computed from scorei. If the GA does not cheat,
the OT module is executed again as previously described, and
the GA obtains identityi.
In the second malicious scheme, MOk counterfeits the
encryption infection status of useri. To address this issue, the
GA sends to MOk the infection status of users multiplied by
a constant, e.g., EncGA(si · TokenGA), where TokenGA is
known to the GA only. The GA detects a cheat if the ciphered
score computed by MOk does not decrypt to a multiple of
TokenGA (i.e., Scorei · TokenGA).
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation Settings
We perform our experiments considering a population of
N = 1.5 millions users, whose mobility is traced every 20 sec-
onds within an overall period of 1 hour. The initial position of
the generic useri is given by xi = Ricos(θi), yi = Risin(θi),
being Ri and θi two random variables that follow the Gaussian
distribution (with zero mean and standard deviation equal
to 3800m) and the uniform distribution defined over [0, 2pi],
respectively. Users move following the Gauss-Markov model
[16] (40% of them at an average speed of 0.01m/s, 40% at
1m/s and the remaining 20% at 14m/s). The region occupied
by the population is 1900km2 large, and is covered by
K ∈ [2, 5] MOs, who have the same number of subscribers
N
K . 1% of the whole population is assumed to be currently
positive.
B. Data Overhead
We now show the overhead generated in each phase of
execution of the protocol, being b the bit-length of the shares
exchanged by participants (in our simulations b = 25 bits).
1) Contact tracing phase: We assume that two users have
a contact if their distance is below th = 2m. The overhead
generated to evaluate if there is a contact is 18b2 + 10b.
The number of these evaluations depend on the number of
users currently located within a given area, which in turns
depends on its size. To avoid comparisons among users with
a negligible probability to meet, we assume that contacts are
searched within non-overlapping squares of size l. In Fig. 3,
we show the average and maximum overhead generated by
each MO to execute the contact tracing phase over an area
of size l ∈ {10, 35, 60, ..., 285} meters. From this figure,
we observe a super-linear increase of both the average and
maximum overhead per area with increasing l. We also notice
that the overhead is higher when decreasing the number of
involved MOs K. While the average overhead is always less
than 6.8 Mbytes, the maximum overhead grows significantly
with l. As an example, when K = 2 the maximum overhead
goes from 0.01 to 134 Mbytes when l goes from 10 to 285
meters.
2) Score Computation phase: With 4096 bit-long cipher-
texts [17], the overhead at each execution of the score compu-
tation phase (every 1 hour in our simulations) is 768 Mbytes
from the GA to the MOs (i.e., obtained by delivering the
infection status of users), and 153 Mbytes among MOs (i.e.,
obtained by exchanging the infection status of their users in
case of contact).
3) Communication with users phase: The overhead gener-
ated in the user-triggered communication is negligible (i.e., 1.5
Kbytes/user). On the other hand, the GA-triggered communi-
cation generates a total overhead of 14NχNkb2 + 2NχNkb+
Nb bits, where Nχ is the number of users whose score is ≥ χ.
For instance, for K = 5 and χ = 10 the overhead is 4650
Mbytes. Although this value can be considered acceptable,
we note that it would be much higher if longer periods and
a higher number of users were considered. To reduce this
overhead, the GA sends to the MO both the share JindexiK
and a range [indexi−η−, indexi+η+] that indicates the rows
of Table I in which the identity of useri should be searched.
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Fig. 3: Overhead of data exchanged by each MO, during the
contact tracing phase, within areas of size l
TABLE II: Time needed to perform the contact tracing phase within a given subarea
Size of Subareas l (meters)
10 35 60 85 110 135 160 185 210 235 260 285
Avg Timing (seconds) 2 · 10−5 2.4 · 10−2 1.8 · 10−1 6.7 · 10−1 1.7 3.8 7.2 12.4 20.2 30.8 45.7 64.1
Max Timing (seconds) 7 · 10−2 1 5.1 15.6 37.7 78.3 143.5 244.1 388.5 599.1 892.7 1260.6
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Fig. 4: Trade-off between data overhead and privacy with
varying the range η, for several values of the threshold χ and
K = 5
Since the GA-triggered communication is issued only for users
with a score ≥ χ, the MO discovers that one among its users
with index ∈ [indexi − η−, indexi + η+] in Table I has a
higher-then-average chance to be positive. Hence, there is a
trade-off between overhead and useri’s privacy. We measure
privacy as the probability that her MO discovers that useri has
a score ≥ χ, i.e., privacyi = 1− 1η , where η = η−+η+. In Fig.
4, we show the trade-off between overhead and privacy with
varying η ∈ [1, 200], for χ ∈ [10, 20, 30, 40]. From this figure,
we observe that a very high level of privacy can be reached
at a remarkable reduction of the overhead. For instance, for
χ = 10 the overhead drops from 4650 to 5 Mbytes if we
accept 99.5% of the total privacy.
C. Computational Time
In Table II we show the average and maximum time needed
to compute the contacts among users, for several values of l.
We note that l should not exceed 85 meters to allow a sampling
of users’ mobility every 20 seconds. Then, the GA-triggered
communication for a single user takes τ · η, with τ = 6ms on
a Intel Core I7 computer. When K = 5, the identities of users
with score ≥ 10 are obtained in 66 minutes if total privacy
is considered (i.e., if η = 3 · 105). This value drops to 2.64
seconds if the 99.5% of privacy is considered sufficient.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a privacy-preserving protocol that enables a
GA (owning users’ infection status) and several MOs (owning
accurate estimations of users’ positions) to compute the num-
ber of contacts that users have with positive persons, during a
considered period. The protocol guarantees that such measure
is only obtained by the legitimate user, and that her infection
status and mobility data are known, respectively, only to her
MO and to the GA. The protocol can also be employed i) to
make a user know the number of positive people who stayed
in her same area (even thought not in close contact with her)
and ii) to make the GA discover the identities only of users
with the highest chance to be positive. We evaluated the cost
of privacy in terms of overhead generated by the protocol.
From extensive simulations, we observed that the overhead is
acceptable, and can further be reduced at a negligible reduction
of users’ privacy.
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